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Abstract
This study analyzes East German representations of Hungary in cultural texts to
investigate the emergence of a German socialist identity in the 1950s and 1960s. I further
contend that post-1945 self- and collective identity in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
was complex and formulated by official, intellectual, and mass perceptions. By examining East
German iconography of Hungary it becomes clear that socialist identity in the early years of the
dictatorship relied on traditional expressions of society as well as ideology. Hungary provided
East Germans with a practical model for socialist friendship. Though the GDR was a state that
ostensibly celebrated multiculturalism, East German texts presented the People‟s Republic of
Hungary almost as another Germany with a shared heritage and culture. They articulated this
palatable image of Hungary through the lens of ideology (Marxist-Leninist internationalism) and
through traditional cultural definitions. This study concludes that East Germans used a
composite of socialist ideas and folk customs to draw parallels with Hungary and create a
distinct character that was both German and socialist.
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Introduction
“Aus, aus, aus, aus - das Spiel ist aus! Deutschland ist Weltmeister.” West German
sports announcer Herbert Zimmerman passionately exclaimed that now famous statement as
West Germany won the final game of the 1954 World Cup against Hungary‟s “golden team.”
Zimmerman continued in an emotional voice and the rare post-war sentiment of national pride:
“Unser Stolz, unsere Freude und unseren ganz innigen Dank den elf Spielern in weißen Jersey
und schwarzen Hosen.”1 However, not all Germans shared Zimmerman‟s enthusiasm. East
German announcer Wolfgang Hempel reported the end of the game in a somewhat clinical
manner, expressing little of the passion behind Zimmerman‟s pronouncements: “Das
Unvorstellbar ist passiert. Die Westdeutschen Nationalmannschaft wird Fußball Weltmeister
1954 in Endspiel gegen Ungarn mit ein 3:2 Sieg durch ein Tor von Rand acht Minuten vor dem
Abpfiff. Die ganze Fußball Welt steht auf dem Kopf.”2 In an interview toward the end of his
life, Hempel admitted that East German officials had given him explicit directions to report West
Germany‟s games as he would any other Western nation. Members of the Central Committee
instructed him that his friends were the Hungarians (“Eure richtigen Freunde, sagten sie, sind die
Ungarn. Die westdeutsche Mannschaft behandelt ihr wie jede andere Mannschaft aus dem Westen.”)3

Though the regime approved of his impartial coverage, East German fans did not. Hempel
disclosed that he received numerous letters after the World Cup from football fans in the GDR
1

Herbert Zimmerman, “Reportage vom Endspiel um die Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft 1954 im Berner WankdorfStadion,” 4.7.1954, Wir sind wieder wer (Berlin: Deutsches Historisches Museum, Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv,
1995). Translation: “Over, over, over, over – the game is over! Germany is World Champion.”
“Our pride, our joy, and our heartfelt thanks to the eleven players in white jerseys and black shorts.”
2
Wolfgang Hempel, “Reportage vom Endspiel um die Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft 1954 im Berner WankdorfStadion,” 4.7.1954. Translation: “The unimaginable has happened. The West German national team has become
football 1954 world champions in the final match against Hungary with a 3:2 victory because of a goal from Rand
eight minutes before the final whistle. The entire football world is on its head.”
3
Wolfgang Kohrt, “Eure Freunde sind die Ungarn,” Berliner Zeitung (14. Oktober 2003). Accessed online
archive: http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2003/1014/blickpunkt/0001/.
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who accused him of not showing enough enthusiasm at the end of the game and not fully
supporting West Germany, who were after all also German. 4 The story of Hempel‟s subdued
treatment of West Germany‟s victory over socialist Hungary represents the ambivalent position
in which East Germans found themselves in the 1950s. Many were divided between a socialist
identity promoted by the regime and their familiar German identity that tied them to their
capitalist counterparts.
Despite familial, linguistic, and ethnic connections to West Germany, by 1989 East
Germans had developed an identity that was distinct to the socialist regime. After the Wende, or
turn, the cultural differences between East and West became apparent. East Germans had lived in
a non-competitive, socialist dictatorship, while West Germans had been associated throughout
the Cold War with freedom and democracy. In the context of unification, the distinctions
between the Federal Republic‟s (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic‟s (GDR) social,
political, and economic boundaries became markedly apparent and unified Germany was
constructed to fit West Germany‟s cultural character.5 As a result, many East Germans felt
colonized and self-identified as Ossis not Germans.
It is therefore important to evaluate East German history in the context of its socialist
development and its relationship to other socialist countries. The GDR and its Eastern Bloc
neighbors sought to craft a society in opposition to the West‟s capitalism. The early years,
though tempered by repression and an ever-increasing state apparatus, were characterized by
intellectual optimism and hope for a unified Communist project with the goal of establishing
egalitarian societies. This study analyzes cultural East German representations of the People‟s
4

Ibid.
Andreas Staab, National Identity in Eastern Germany: Inner Unification or Continued Separation? (Westport,
CT, London: Praeger, 1998), 9.
5
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Republic of Hungary (UVR, or Ungarische Volksrepublik) and the Magyar people in order to
address questions about East German culture, socialist self- and collective identity as well as
traditional folk identities.
The Socialist Unity Party, or SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), used
Hungary as an image of socialist partnership. Although the Soviet Military Administration
(SMAD) undertook extensive efforts beginning in 1947 to articulate socialist identity and
internationalism by highlighting connections to the Soviet Union, most ordinary Germans in the
Soviet zone, and later East Germany, were suspicious of SMAD and the Communist Party. In
the early years of the GDR Johannes Becher, the chief German cultural leader in the East, was
more successful in pushing the project of Soviet-German friendship. He established
organizations like the Kulturbund, the Society for the Study of the Culture of the Soviet Union,
and Soviet-German friendship societies to gain the support of intellectuals, though they were met
with resistance for harsh censorship policies. Still, the memory of Soviet-perpetrated rape and
atrocity tainted German perceptions of their Soviet occupiers and subsequently the Communists
and the Soviet- sponsored SED. The legacy of post-war violence continued to undermine
government legitimacy and German-Soviet relations. 6 Hungary, which suffered similar atrocities
at the hands of the Russians, provided a practical alternative with which to model socialist
friendship.
After 1949 the regime fashioned a socialist identity that better appealed to East Germans,
most of whom were exhausted from the National Socialist years, war, and Soviet occupation.
The people did not always exist in opposition to the regime‟s projects, and were often willing to

6

Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 121.
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adapt to new political realties or restraints. Recent scholarship has moved away from historical
approaches that paint East Germany as a uniform political regime or a dichotomous society
composed of a repressive state and people in opposition to that state.7 Historians have
recognized that East Germany was instead a complex, textured society, composed of intertwining
ideas and various levels of existence. Their studies examine wide-ranging topics including
compromise, grass-roots participation, “normalization,” consumerism, and the history of the
everyday, or Alltagsgeschichte, in East Germany. 8 In the years following the repression of
Nazism and the Soviet Military Administration, East Germans reconstructed their lives and
adjusted to existence in the German Democratic Republic. The 1950s and „60s thus provide an
interesting framework for a study about East German official and popular representation of other
socialist nations, as disillusionment with “real-existing socialism” had not yet crystallized as it
did with younger generations in the late 1970s and „80s. During the first decade of the new
regime there was a genuine optimism amongst workers, peasants, and leftist intellectuals, some
of whom chose to immigrate to the East German state.9 Many East German citizens believed
they were participating in a larger project to establish a true socialist society. Rhetoric and
literature in the 1950s was not only optimistic but also filled with references to future utopias.

7

See Sigrid Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft. Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der
DDR, 1945-1989 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992) and Jürgen Kocka and Martin Sabrow, Die DDR als
Geschichte, vol. 2 in Zeithistorische Studien (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994). Meuschel posited that East German
society “withered away” instead of the state.
8
See David Bathrick, Powers of Speech: The Politics of Culture in the GDR (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1995), Joshua Feinstein, The Triumph of the Ordinary: Depictions of Daily Life in East German Cinema,
1949-1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), Mary Fulbrook, The People‟s State: East
German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2008), Jeannette Madársz,
Conflict and Compromise in East Germany, 1971-1989: A Precarious Stability (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003), Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2008), and Esther von Richthofen, Bringing Culture to the Masses: Control
Compromise, and Participation in the GDR (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009).
9
For example, authors Anna Seghers and Bertolt Brecht viewed the GDR as a better alternative to the capitalist
West.
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Other citizens simply wanted to move on after the crisis of world war and economic
depression. Eventually the “age of ideology” gave way to a type of “consumer socialism” in the
late 1950s and „60s.10 Mary Fulbrook argues that the concept of “normalization,” or adjustment
to social and political realities, should be applied to this period of life in the GDR. 11 Though
society was inundated with Party rhetoric and propaganda, the structures of everyday existence
predominated over politics and ideology. People worked, traveled within limits, found
happiness, and actively participated in or abstained from the East German state.12 Alon Confino
also suggests that East Germans found a balance between politics and everyday life by
participating in the very regime that repressed their freedoms. 13 Fulbrook marks 1961 and the
construction of the Berlin Wall as the moment the state‟s future became certain. The production
of a tangible border cemented the realities of life in the GDR, and with it the possibility of
German unification diminished in the minds of East Germans. 14 Using a similar framework,
Pierre Kende points to the 1956 Hungarian revolution as the moment of Hungarian
normalization. He contends that Hungary‟s defeat by the Soviet Union was total and with the
Nagy government hopes of a liberalized Hungarian nation also disappeared.15
Likewise, East Germans began the process of establishing ordinary lifestyles and routines
as early as the Soviet suppression of the 1953 Uprising. Even before 1953 East Germans

10

Mary Fulbrook, The People‟s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, London: Yale
University Press, 2008), 12.
11
Mary Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟ and the GDR in Comparative Perspective,” in Power and
Society in the GDR, 1961-1979: The „Normalisation‟ of Rule? edited by Mary Fulbrook (New York, London:
Berghahn Books, 2009), 2-5.
12
Fulbrook, The People‟s State, ix.
13
Alon Confino, “The Travels of Bettina Humpel: One Stasi File and the Narratives of State and Self in East
Gemrany,” in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics, Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, eds.
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 133.
14
Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟ and the GDR in Comparative Perspective,” 6.
15
Pierre Kende, “The post-1956 Hungarian Normalization,” in W. Brus, P. Kende, and Z. Mlynar, eds.
“Normalization” Processes, 6.
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engaged in everyday activities within the new socialist dictatorship. The GDR‟s establishment in
1949 marked a departure from the aberration of war and occupation and a return to the mundane
as East Germans began to focus on rebuilding a semblance of their pre-war lives. Many once
again embraced local identity and customs they had practiced before the war. The Cultural
Ministry was at first wary of the continuance of provincial customs but eventually appropriated
folk ideas to encourage state legitimacy. Though extensive cooperation between state and people
was not established until Fulbrook‟s 1961 designation, many East German citizens accepted the
circumstances of the society in which they lived much earlier. The East German regime also
actively attempted to normalize its relationship to society. Confino asserts that modern,
ideological regimes like the GDR derived legitimacy from maintaining happiness or at least the
illusion of a normal life. 16 Thus, the SED could not ignore public opinion, and indeed, part of
the process of establishing a standard of familiarity with new ideologies and post-war realities
involved the cultivation of a “socialist personality.” Even in the 1950s East German citizens
internalized a specific East German identity. Though many grew weary of ideology and agitprop,
East Germans did not ignore politics, especially in the early years of the GDR. Particularly after
1953, GDR citizens began to absorb the socialist personality and reconceptualize their oncenegative relationship to Moscow. The state also worked to form close friendships with other
East European republics like Hungary. Affected by propaganda, education, and travel, many East
Germans in the 1950s developed a sense of camaraderie with their socialist neighbors. Moreover,
the East German state used images of other socialist states to promote a Marxist-Leninist
personality. Depictions of Hungary were part of this project and by the 1960s informed the way
East Germans perceived and thought about their socialist counterparts in Hungary.
16

Confino, “The Travels of Bettina Humpel,” 134.
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The state‟s attempt to create a socialist personality by appealing to ties with foreign
nations was combined with their efforts to socialize the familiar. The regime compromised by
fashioning an attractive form of socialism as sentiments of loyalty to Germanness still pervaded
the East German consciousness. Their West German counterparts were more familiar and most
East Germans maintained close connections to Germans in the Federal Republic throughout the
forty year duration of the GDR. In addition, the zealous policy of antifascism encouraged a
culture of forgetting that allowed East Germans to maintain pride for aspects of their German
heritage. In order to make socialism more palatable to East Germans the regime employed the
traditional trope of Heimat.
Jan Palmowski argues that the GDR regime encouraged the idea of a socialist Heimat
beginning in the 1950s. Though defined by the state, socialist Heimat allowed East Germans to
articulate a new identity that maintained regional and local ties.17 It urged participation in
transforming society and provided a medium through which East Germans could express a sense
of belonging. The iconography of the 1950s and „60s combined seemingly disparate ideologies
by drawing on tradition, a sense of change, and socialist ideology.18 Palmowski further contends
that local identities were not destroyed during the 1950s in favor of ideological antifascism
which often equated Heimat and Nazism. Instead, the GDR regime appropriated the idea of
local Heimat to promote new loyalties to socialism and the state.19 This study expands on
Palmowski‟s notion of socialist Heimat by analyzing how this traditional concept was applied to
international relations.
17

Jan Palmowski, “Learning the Rules: Local Activists and the Heimat,” in Power and Society in the GDR, 19611979: The „Normalisation‟ of Rule? edited by Mary Fulbrook (New York, London: Berghahn Books, 2009), 151.
18
Ibid.
19
Jan Palmowski, “Defining the East German Nation: The Construction of a Socialist Heimat, 1945-1962,”
Central European History 37 (2004), 367-368.
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The SED used familiar images of Hungary to promote socialist Heimat. Socialist identity
was therefore not a separate personality but a bridge between familiar ideas of collective identity
and the new notion of socialist solidarity. Hungarian-German friendship was for East Germans
palatable and so served the purpose of promoting socialist cohesion. The acculturation of a
socialist personality also encouraged the sentiment that East Germans were contributing to a
larger socialist project. Socialist fraternity resonated with both high and mass culture, as it was
evoked in numerous facets of East German society from textbooks to art to popular literature and
sport. By using the medium of printed sources, it is possible to discern the directives of the
regime and intellectual ideas, yet these sources also enable the reader to explore messages
intended for mass consumption.
In the 1950s and „60s negotiating identity in the GDR was an amalgamation of
encouraging socialist solidarity and maintaining a traditional German identity. The multi-faceted
East German identity of the 1950s both embraced and rejected the past and looked to new
ideologies in Marxist-Leninism. Socialist states also created a Freund-Feindbild (Concept of the
Friend and Enemy) paradigm that cast the capitalist West as enemy and socialist comrades as
friends. The socialist personality was defined in opposition to the Feindbild. The Feindbild
represented the dialectic between friend and enemy based on class orientation and political
system, while the Freundbild depicted ideologically similar people, motivated by the same goals
and in unity with their socialist brethren.20
East German leaders encouraged sentiments of loyalty through depictions of likeminded
people. They presented compatible images of Hungarians and East Germans in newspapers,

20

Silke Satjukow and Rainer Gries, eds. Unsere Feinde. Konstruktionen des Anderen im Sozialismus (Leipzig:
Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2004), 13-15.
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magazines, and historical texts. By using countries like Hungary to craft a separate socialist
identity that transcended national borders, the SED regime endeared itself to the Soviet Union,
legitimated its claims to Marxist internationalism, and most important, provided East Germans
with a new identity opposed to the capitalist Western “Other.” The SED used the concept of
Freundbild to establish how East Germans should think about foreign policy and their socialist
counterparts in the UVR.
Historians have yet to consider how East Germans re-imagined their relationship with the
People‟s Republic of Hungary during the first two decades of the GDR. Hungary had been an
ally during the Second World War and was also negotiating its new role under Communist rule
and Soviet influence. East Germany and Hungary were unique during the post-war period in
Europe. Both had popular uprisings in the 1950s that directly challenged Soviet authority and
caused them to become symbols of opposition and victims of Soviet oppression in the West.
Scholars have further neglected to analyze how East Germany‟s relationship to Hungary
contributed to the formation of an East German identity. The GDR‟s images of Hungary
reflected traditional forms of German intellectual and cultural life. East Germany‟s iconography
of their socialist as well as Western counterparts illustrates the fluidity of identity in the GDR.
Historians have extensively covered the topic of post-1945 German identity. Jeffrey Herf
contends that postwar identity was formulated through connections to the past, be it the Weimar
period or the more recent violence of the Holocaust. East German leaders like Walter Ulbricht
and Wilhelm Pieck gained their political legitimacy during the Communist movement of the
inter-war years. 21 To be sure, the memory of the past and especially the legacy of the Second

21

Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard
University Press, 1997).

10

World War continued to inform Germans and historians of Germany alike. However,
constructing identity was more complicated than Herf‟s historical memory and even more
complex than Benedict Anderson‟s socially constructed “imagined communities.”22 Rather,
people in postwar Germany possessed numerous identities. Their personal and collective
character was formulated through interpersonal relationships, through engaging with the state,
and principal to this study, by comparing themselves to others.
Fulbrook diverges from Herf in that she tries to reconstruct a more textured East German
history by illustrating that East Germans were informed by their present as well as their past and
the local as well as the national. 23 She recognizes that, like everyone, Germans (even East
Germans in a repressive dictatorship) led complex lives and that their identity was neither
monolithic nor fixed. This study builds on Fulbrook‟s notion that East German identity was
complicated by illuminating another component of the East German weltanschauung:
identification of a familiar “Other.”
It is possible to explore both collective identity and cultural life in the early years of the
German Democratic Republic through the framework of East German representation of Hungary.
The following chapters will address East Germany‟s portrayals of a shared revolutionary
heritage, parallels in official, intellectual, and mass culture, and direct interaction through travel.
It is important to note that these categories did not develop in isolation from each other. State
policy and popular perceptions coexisted in a reciprocal relationship, each informing the other.
Both official and popular renderings of Hungary provide insight regarding the reality and
22

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and the Spread of Nationalism (New
York: Verso, 1983, 2006). Anderson defines “imagined communities” as “limited, sovereign, and elastic.” East
German identity in the liminal space of the 1950s was beyond elastic. He also underestimates ideology‟s role in
formulating identity.
23
Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
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pretenses of East German socialist identity, Marxist internationalism, and trans-cultural relations
in the Eastern Bloc. Images of Hungary‟s revolutionary heritage and folk traditions served the
GDR‟s objective of articulating identity through affiliation with other socialist nations instead of
by comparison with West Germany. Significantly, Hungary provided East Germans a lens
through which to understand other Communist dictatorships and formulate their own socialist
identity.

12

Chapter 1: Memorialization of a Shared Revolutionary Tradition
The East German regime sought to legitimate itself by portraying East Germans as the
inheritors of the German revolutionary tradition from Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, and Karl
Liebknecht. Germany, after all, was the birth place of socialism and East Germany thus the
proper expression of Germany‟s historical progress and final culmination in socialism after
suffering under the highest stage of capitalism: fascism. GDR leaders observed that Hungary
had evolved to socialism through similar means. East German authors likewise appropriated the
legacy of revolution in Hungary to show close parallels and an analogous heritage. East
Germans therefore illustrated their own dialectic of history by analyzing Hungary‟s historical
progression from oppression to revolution,
The focus on the People‟s Republic of Hungary (UVR) as a participant in Germany‟s
revolutionary heritage not only served the state‟s diplomatic mission to strengthen ties with
countries in the Eastern Bloc but also established East Germany as a cultural and socialist leader
in Eastern Europe. In order to legitimate its special status, the SED stressed Germany‟s rich
socialist history, beginning of course with the father of scientific socialism, Karl Marx.
The East German regime was aware of its symbolic importance in the Cold War and
perpetuated the idea that reunification was their priority. At the twenty-fifth Plenum of the
Central Committee in 1955, leaders emphasized the necessity of East Germany‟s success not
only for sake of democracy and peace in Germany but also to ensure the prolonged existence of
worldwide socialism. 24 Politische Grundschule (Political Primary School), a text designed to
teach citizens about “der erste Staat der Arbeiter und Bauern” (the first state of the workers and
24

Zentralkomitee der SED, ed. Politische Grundschule. Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik – der erste Staat
der Arbeiter und Bauern in der Geschichte Deutschlands – die Basis im Kampf um die nationale Wiedervereinigung
Deutschlands (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959), 119.
Quoted from an issue of Neues Deutschland published on 1 November 1955.
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peasants), further stressed the GDR‟s unique position in the history of socialism: “The founding
of the GDR, which Stalin described as a „turning-point in the history of Europe‟ has greater
historical significance for further revolutionary transformation…” 25 It also posited that the GDR
was a paradigm of socialist economic structure, a model for other central European socialist
states, and a leader in the Warsaw Pact.26 Part of this assumed exceptionality centered on a
divided Germany, but it was in equal part due to Germany‟s revolutionary heritage. The official
iconography of Hungary‟s revolutionary tradition, therefore, mirrored the German model. East
Germans highlighted events, such as the 1848 revolutions and the 1919 Communist uprisings,
which also took place in Germany, to illustrate Hungary‟s evolution to socialism.
East German leaders and intellectuals interpreted the 1848 revolutions in both Germany
and Hungary as reactions against similar oppressors. In Germany, Prussian Junkers subjugated
the lower classes, while Hungary suffered under the rule of the Hapsburg monarchy. During the
early 1950s, the dictatorships of the GDR and Hungary appropriated the image of the “Prussian”
and the “Habsburg” as Feindbilder. Propaganda during the 1950s often sought to demonstrate
continuity from the rule of Junker and Austrian lord to the fascist regimes of Adolf Hitler and
Miklós Horthy.27 These Feindbilder became synonymous with Western imperialism, and after
de-Stalinization, with cults of personality. Interestingly, the Habsburg and Prussian Feindbilder
were also appropriated to fit a socialist Sonderweg position. Hungarian historians in the late
1950s and early 1960s claimed that the Hapsburg monarchy could only be interpreted as an
25

Ibid., 30.
Original quote: “Die Gründung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (7. Oktober 1949), die J.W. Stalin als
einen „Wendepunkt in der Geschichte Europas‟ bezeichnete, hat große historische Bedeutung sowohl für die weitere
revolutionäre Umgestaltung…”
26
Ibid., 51, 62.
27
Árpád von Klimó, “‟Habsburger‟ und „Preußen‟. Historische Feindbilder und ihre Wandlungen in Ungarn und
der DDR im Vergleich,” in Unsere Feinde. Konstruktion des Anderen im Sozialismus, edited by Silke Satjukow and
Rainer Gries (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2004), 517.
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imperialistic oppressor-state (Unterdrückungsstaat) that had hindered the normal development of
Hungary‟s economic history and thus led to fascism under Horthy. 28
The German-Hungarian Historical Commission, or Kommission der Historiker der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Volksrepublik Ungarn, collaborated throughout the
1960s and 1970s for the purpose of illuminating the parallels in German and Hungarian history.
Their accessible study Die Ungarische Revolution von 1848/49 und die Demokratische
Bewegung in Deutschland, or “The Hungarian Revolution of 1848/49 and the Democratic
Movement in Germany,” explored these parallels through the framework of Marxist history. In
the foreword, economic historian Iván Berend legitimated the purpose of the joint historical
commission. He emphasized the practical elements of their research by claiming that historical
investigation helped strengthen socialist society and friendships through new knowledge. His
implicit case for funding and continued research was therefore structured in scientific and
diplomatic terms, both of which appealed to the SED regime. An exploration of the historical
relationship of the GDR and the UVR as well as an exchange of expert opinions between
objective German and Hungarian historians would strengthen the contemporary friendship of
these socialist nations. The project also served to expand knowledge of a mutual and important
revolutionary past. This historical text was thus a symbol of the productive collaborative work
(“als ein Symbol der guten Zusammenarbeit”) between Berlin and Budapest. 29
East German historian Karl Obermann further highlighted the theme of collaboration and
solidarity throughout the study. He contended that not only were the 1848 revolutions in
Hungary and Germany comparable but they also marked the first collaboration between German
28

Ibid., 518.
Iván Berend, “Vorwort,” in Die Ungarische Revolution von 1848/ 49 und die Demokratische Bewegung in
Deutschland, by Karl Obermann, edited by Kommission der Historiker der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
und der Volksrepublik Ungarn (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971), 7.
29
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and Hungarian revolutionaries in their struggle for democracy. 30 Obermann described the
Hungarian Revolution as characteristic of the exceptional events of 1848. Both revolutions
constituted the high point of political and social conflict in the first half of the nineteenth
century. Although Obermann did not ignore that these were primarily bourgeois revolutions, he
emphasized the role of democratic elements and workers. For instance, he portrayed Lajos
Kossuth, leader of the Hungarian revolt, as a charismatic champion of the proletariat. Despite
the revolution‟s failure, Kossuth‟s name continued to stand for the people‟s movement for
freedom and independence.31 Most important, this study stressed German interaction with
Kossuth and other revolutionaries during their struggle for democracy.
According to Obermann, the Magyar people communicated frequently with sympathetic
Germans. Revolutionary Germans supported the Hungarian fight against the feudal, reactionary
Habsburgs, as it was reminiscent of their own struggle against Prussian Junkers and
counterrevolutionaries. Obermann returned to Robert Blum as the epitome of a German
revolutionary in his commitment to the ideological struggle against oppression. Blum was a man
of humble origins, devoted to the ideal of equality, and a leading member of the failed
Frankfurter Nationalversammlung, or National Assembly. He was also illegally executed for
revolutionary activity during the Oktoberaufstand, or October Uprising, in Vienna. Obermann
stated that the counterrevolutionary forces in Vienna naively believed that revolutionary
sentiment could be eliminated if they executed Blum and ignored institutions like the National
Assembly. 32 Instead, the legacy of Blum and Hungarian revolutionary Sándor Petőfi came to
symbolize the internationalist element of 1848. Blum provided Obermann with the ideal martyr
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through which to illustrate the early revolutionary cause as well as a representative of German
determination to aid their revolutionary comrades suffering under Hapsburg rule.
The failure of the October Uprising and the defeat of the “heroic Hungarian people” was
said to have ultimately signaled the collapse of revolutionary hope in all of Europe. 33 Obermann
described the shock of German revolutionaries and their conviction that the suppression of
Hungary‟s fight for freedom, the disintegration of Germany‟s constitution, and the oppression of
Russian revolutionaries were all connected events. 34 An East German teaching guide likewise
underlined the collaborative nature of Germany‟s and Hungary‟s bourgeois revolutions.35 It
outlined the parallel victories of the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary, Poland, Austria,
and Prussia, stating that the bourgeoisie capitulated and were subsequently suppressed. 36 The text
stated that though reactionaries returned to power to enforce the old “system of slavery” of
Metternich and Louis Philippe, the revolutionary spirit of 1848 persisted and would affect later
change.
To illustrate this revolutionary partnership, Obermann‟s study included extracts from
nineteenth-century German documents applauding the Hungarian uprising and the democratic
movement. Most indicative of the message the German-Hungarian Historical Committee wanted
to relay was their inclusion of posters urging Germans to join their Hungarian brothers-in-arms.
The first placard printed contained a message familiar to East Germans by the end of the 1960s.
The word “Cameraden,” or Comrades, is printed in bold across the top of the page, and the first
sentence used recognizable ideological language: “Ich bringe Euch den herzlichen Gruß und den
33
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brüderlichen Händedruck der uns zu Hilfe geeilten Brüder aus Ungarn.” 37 (I bring you heartfelt
greetings and brotherly handshakes to hurry to the aid of our brethren in Hungary.) These words
indicated a long-standing revolutionary partnership between Germans and Hungarians and
underlined socialist fraternity.
However, Obermann‟s emphasis on collaboration between these revolutionary
movements at times clouded the differences between events in Germany and Hungary, which
must be understood in their respective cultural context. In addition, he frequently conflated the
Magyar as one Volk whose revolution was oppressed by “tsarist” forces in 1849. It is significant
that Obermann used the term “tsarist” instead of “Russian” to describe the Russia‟s intervention.
By doing so, he preserved Soviet legitimacy and provided East Germans reading this text with a
somewhat simplified and satisfying image of the Hungarian role in the 1848 revolutions.
Obermann‟s description unequivocally connected Hungary to German history and heritage. By
intertwining their own history with the history of Hungary, these East German authors fashioned
a common narrative of the German-Hungarian past that appealed to both traditional and socialist
sentiments.
Historical texts in the GDR also treated contemporary events and used revolutionary
history as a framework for relaying political and ideological messages. In particular, after the
1956 uprising in Hungary, socialist regimes sought to maintain the revolutionary authenticity of
the People‟s Republic of Hungary and the Soviet Union. Authors therefore emphasized
ubiquitous counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary‟s history by drawing parallels between the
events of 1848, 1918-19, and 1956. The 1918 Communist revolution in Hungary led by Béla
Kun was upheld as a model of temporary success, unlike the failed Communist
37
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Spartakusaufstand (Spartacus Uprising) that took place the same year in Berlin. However, the
same variety of counterrevolutionaries that stopped Liebknecht‟s and Luxemburg‟s uprising
would reverse Kun‟s revolution as well and put an end to the Hungarian Räterepublik, or
representative people‟s government.38 Official agitprop classified the 1956 Hungarian uprising
as an attempt to overthrow the existing Communist state. It too was orchestrated by similar
ambiguously defined, but malevolent, counterrevolutionaries.
An example of this comparative trend was Heinz Lindner‟s 1958 text Revolution und
Konterrevolution in Ungarn in den Jahren 1918/19, or Revolution and Counterrevolution in
Hungary in 1918/19. Writing after the 1956 uprising, Lindner manufactured continuities
between counterrevolutionary forces in 1919 and 1956. Indeed, the belief that history should
serve political and ideological purpose was widely held by GDR officials and writers. Lindner
echoed this idea in his emphasis on connections between the events of 1919 and 1956: “The
function of this reading should be above all to analyze the history of the Hungarian soviet
republic in light of the Hungarian events of autumn of 1956 and accordingly to draw political
conclusions.”39 Lindner‟s purpose was also to stimulate further German studies regarding the
Hungarian Räterepublik upon its fortieth anniversary in 1959. 40 Accordingly, Lindner reiterated
the motif of international socialist triumph over its collective Feinde (enemies).
Hungary‟s Räterepublik, he announced, represented the positive and natural development
of a people‟s democracy. Lindner claimed that the Communist Party of Hungary was the first
38
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Communist party that attempted to follow the model of the Soviet Union after the October
Revolution. It signaled the evolution of a new stage in the Hungarian worker‟s movement, a
stage in which ideas of equality and democracy were finally realized. 41 Lindner juxtaposed the
democratic victory of the Räterepublik with earlier forms of Hungary‟s political history with the
Habsburgs, as both periods ostensibly marginalized the majority of the population. In an attempt
to provide a Marxist pattern for Hungary‟s development, Lindner compressed in a few pages the
dialectic of Hungary‟s past. Under the leadership of Sándor Petőfi and Lajos Kossuth the
workers began to emerge from under the oppressive shadow of Habsburg “feudalism.”42 Like
Obermann, Lindner minimized the bourgeois and nationalistic nature of the 1848 revolt in
Hungary. Instead, he focused on the emergence of a cogent worker‟s movement and class
consciousness. In this way, Lindner, like socialist officials of the GDR and Hungary, allowed
established bourgeois heroes, such as Petőfi, to remain enshrined in the national iconography of
socialist nations.
However, the Communist revolutions of 1918-19 provided East German authors with a
resolutely socialist catalogue of heroes. It was through these figures that Lindner, like
Obermann, addressed the historical relations between Germans and Hungarians. He focused
particularly on the revolutionary struggles of analogous Communist figures: Germans Karl
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and the courageous Béla Kun. Instead of direct interaction
between these German and Hungarian revolutionaries as in the 1848 revolutions, Revolution und
Konterrevoltuion emphasized shared experiences. Germans and Hungarians suffered under
repressive and violent imperialism during the First World War and were educated in Marxist
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radicalism. Significantly, Lindner pointed out that most of the Hungarian communists spent time
in Russia during the war and experienced the success of their Russian comrades in 1917. The
implication was, of course, that “unmittelbare Erlebnis” (direct experience) with the October
Revolution allowed for the initial victory in Hungary.43 Lindner even traced continuities to
Hungary‟s later leaders, such as Mátyás Rákosi, who by 1958 had fallen out of favor.
The 1919 German-Hungarian connection was also memorialized in art. A book entitled
Revolutionary Art in Hungary was published by the Ministerium für Kultur der DDR (Ministry
for Culture of the GDR) in 1973.44 It celebrated progressive, oppositional works of numerous
Hungarian artists, yet notably devoted extensive descriptions to Hungarian artists with German
connections. For instance, the collection featured László Mednyánsky and János Nagy Balogh,
both of whom studied at the Akademie für bildene Kunst in Munich, where many of their
revolutionary ideas were formulated. Mednyánsky‟s humanistic paintings often depicted the
futility of war, while Balogh‟s subjects were realistic workers and the everyday. 45 Both men
participated in Hungary‟s Räterepublik and both became martyrs of the worker‟s revolution;
Mednyánsky died in Vienna in 1919 and Balogh in Budapest. Cultural figures like these
painters, Kun, and Liebknecht allowed East German authors to articulate a positive image of
Germany‟s interaction with Hungary.
According to Lindner, the counterrevolutionary resurgence began with Kun‟s concessions
to capitalism. The Communist coalition with the Social-Democrats initiated the process of
decline. Lindner explained that Hungarian Communists faced a difficult position after the war,
but he did not excuse Kun‟s actions and maintained that Kun should have fought for the
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“dictatorship of the proletariat” instead of compromising the principles of Marxist-Leninism. 46
After the compromise and the transformation of the government on 4 April 1919, SocialDemocrats gained the majority in the Räterepublik and defaulted on the promises of the
revolution. The hegemony of the Social-Democrats, what V.I. Lenin called a “backward
compromise with the bourgeoisie,” finally afforded international imperial and fascist
counterrevolutionaries the opportunity to assert themselves and begin the destruction of the
short-lived Hungarian Räterepublik.47
Linder‟s analysis of these counterrevolutionary forces offers a fascinating window into
the East German conception of Feindbild. Lenin warned the Hungarian Communist leaders
against vacillation and compromise with the petty bourgeoisie in 1919. Such cooperation would
lead to deterioration of the Räterepublik and more imperialistic war.48 Lindner confirmed
Lenin‟s prognostication by highlighting the ascendency of the “fascist” Horthy regime in 1920.
He explained that Western imperial powers joined with the Hungarian counterrevolution in order
to defeat the democratic worker‟s republic. Here Lindner drew comparisons to the
“counterrevolution in 1956.” Lindner went so far as to equate the reformist government of Imre
Nagy to Horthy‟s conservative regime. He concluded that Nagy and his compatriots, like
Horthy, betrayed the Hungarian people by aligning with Western militarism to achieve political
hegemony. 49 Likewise, a text profiling the People‟s Republic of Hungary attributed the failure
of the 1919 Räterepublik to the collaboration between Western, imperialistic forces and Admiral
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Horthy‟s counterrevolutionary forces. 50 European and American imperialists were “beside
themselves with rage” (außer sich vor Wut) at the construction of Hungary‟s dictatorship of the
proletariat, which was applauded by Lenin and later Stalin. These Western powers therefore
gave free aid to Hungarian fascists and counterrevolutionaries. 51 In stronger language, Lindner
insisted that the “fascist terror” of 1956 revived the infamy of the 1919 Horthy-counterrevolution
with their brazen murder and destruction. 52
The accusation of betrayal was significant for Lindner‟s context. In 1958 Nagy was
executed for treason. Lindner‟s text thus justified the Soviet repression of the revolt and the
subsequent trials, while casting the West in the role of traditional counterrevolutionary
Klassenfeind (class enemy). Implicit in his text was also the idea that the same malevolent
forces were responsible for the 1953 uprising in East Germany. It is unsurprising that Lindner
connected subversion in the 1950s GDR and Hungary with the brutal legacy of fascism. Lindner
concluded with a cautionary note regarding the still aggressive capitalist West. He emphasized
that the goal of militaristic imperialism was to intervene in socialists‟ collective mission to
spread the proletariat revolution. These Western powers, likewise, had an agenda to extend the
counterrevolution in the form of capitalist imperialism. 53
This view of the capitalist “Other” coincided with contemporaneous documents published
in the Eastern Bloc, especially those that sought to explain the people‟s revolts of the 1950s. By
this period, the United States had emerged as a dominant Western power and was said to embody
the traits of all of socialism‟s common enemies: fascism, feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism.
50

J.F. Gellert, G. Möchel, R. Sommer, B. Szent-Istvanyi, and U. Bamborschke, Volksrepublik Ungarn (Berlin:
Verlag Kultur und Fortschritt, 1955), 77.
51
Ibid., 76.
52
Lindner, Revolution und Konterrevolution, 90.
53
Ibid., 94-95.

23

It is within this context that the foreign ministry of the Hungarian People‟s Republic released a
report called Documents on the Hostile Activity of the United States Government against the
Hungarian People‟s Republic.54 Significantly, the report, which was translated and published in
East Germany in 1953, underscored the motif of shared enemies. The United States as
representative of capitalism and militaristic imperialism presented not only a threat to
Hungarians but also to the peace and stability of the East German people. Through underhanded
methods such as sabotage and espionage, the United States attempted in the late 1940s to subvert
Hungary and draw it back into the fascist, antidemocratic, and reactionary system from which
they had escaped. 55
The report traced the problem of American aggression to their increasingly disingenuous
trade with Hungary after the war and outlined the United States‟ duplicity in economic and
diplomatic terms. The book included excerpts from official documents between representatives
from Hungary and the United States with interpretations of America‟s motives. The report
villainized embassy officials, businesses, the Hungarian-American league in the United States, as
well as President Truman and military generals. The foreign ministry accused American
officials of broad crimes, such as planting agents to undermine the revolution, to specifics like
Truman‟s attempt to sabotage the democratic vote in 1947. 56 The Central Committee released a
statement in 1950 explaining that the “process” that removed Hungarian Minister of Foreign
Affairs László Rajk from authority (and led to his ultimate death) was part of a larger purge of
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agents who secretly served British and American interests.57 In defense of the Stalinist Rákosi,
the document described in detail the way in which Americans planted spies in order to sabotage
the “democratic people‟s republic” and prepare for war against the Soviet Union. 58 The text also
implied that there was little difference between the United States and former fascists in Germany
and Hungary.
For socialist officials, a clear indication of America‟s connection to the legacy of fascism
was the work of MAORT, or the Hungarian-American oil shareholding company (Magyar
Amerikai Olajipari Részvénytársaságot). The oil fields had been bought and a business
partnership organized during the Horthy regime. MAORT continued to operate during the war
and even affiliated with Germany. According to the Hungarian foreign ministry, United States
capitalists decided to take advantage of this “collaborative oil-society” in 1948. Greedy for
increased profits, the American government supported the capitalist plan to sabotage the
arrangement with Hungary. 59
In the same vein as these economic discussions, the text attributed cultural and political
espionage within Hungary to interaction with the imperialist West. The report focused especially
on the protests of Cardinal József Mindszenty, a Catholic cardinal who wrote scathing critiques
of Communism. It claimed that his criticisms were in concert with the American campaign to
undermine the Hungarian People‟s Republic. 60 In this way, Mindszenty, who had spent time in
the United States and was later offered American asylum, was not merely a representative of
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oppressive, Western religion, but also a participant in American diplomatic imperialism. 61
Lindner also portrayed Mindszenty‟s early career as part of the counterrevolution. He stated that
the cardinal was a traitor to the Hungarian people on multiple occasions. The church, Lindner
contended, was complicit in the counterrevolution of 1919. Lindner insisted that the Pope
supported the oppression of expression and the rise of fascism in Hungary. 62 The Hungarian
foreign ministry painted American motives and acts, such as the oil sabotage and the
“Mindszenty-conspiracy,” as nefarious and lacking substance. The report employed only the
tropes of the Feindbild: sabotage, espionage, capitalism, militarism, fascism, and imperialism.
The same terms were later used to categorize the architects of the 1956 autumn uprising
in Hungary. The uncomfortable legacies of 1953 in Germany and 1956 in Hungary haunted
officials in the GDR and the UVR. It was difficult for socialist dictatorships to recover
legitimacy after these popular, spontaneous uprisings. Workers, intellectuals, and ordinary
people had participated in the protests on June 17 1953 (der 17. Juni) as well as in anti-Soviet
protests regarding the suppression in Hungary. As a result, the East German regime was careful
in addressing these events. Officially approved descriptions were usually short ideological
explanations about counterrevolution, Western criminality, and anti-Bolshevism. The 1957
Jahrbuch der DDR accused Radio Free Europe and Western bourgeois conspirators of
instigating reactionary counterrevolution in Hungary. It further claimed that wealthy Americans
funded spies who undermined the UVR‟s regime by spreading imperialist propaganda and
initiating the 1956 uprising.63
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By the late 1950s and „60s, textbooks began to include short discussions of both
revolutions, which were usually conflated in a section about counterrevolutionary forces. One
history textbook, Geschichte 10, for East German students in their tenth year treated 1953 and
1956 as part of “the increasing failure of imperialistic „cold war politics.‟” 64 The teacher‟s guide
to Geschichte 10 explained further that Hungary had been a satellite of fascist Germany in the
Second World War and even in 1956 Catholicism still held sway over the minds of many
people. 65 The short description, however, focused primarily on the Hungarian revolt as an antiproletariat counterrevolutionary putsch. Its depiction of the revolt was meant to bolster state
authority by illustrating the militancy of the West and “the futility of Cold War putsches.” 66 By
outlining Hungary‟s counterrevolution, East German officials could address the issues of 1953
without having to speak directly to an uneasy period in their own history.
Accounts of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 appeared in the GDR as early as 1957. Eva
Priester, an Austrian journalist and Communist sympathizer, likewise described
counterrevolutionary forces as capitalist imperialists in her purportedly empirical account of the
1956 uprising. Priester took advantage of her “special correspondent” status
(Sonderberichterstatter) and traveled to Hungary for six weeks to observe the events surrounding
the uprising that occurred between 23 October and 4 November. Her subsequent eye-witness
narrative Was war in Ungarn wirklich los? (What really happened in Hungary?) was published
in East Berlin a year later.67 East German officials declared Priester‟s report to be not only an
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objective description of the events that surrounded the revolution, but also a thoughtful
explanation of the revolt.68
Interestingly, Priester juxtaposed the radio reports of West and East on 23 October.
Radio Wien pronounced that “Hungary arose against the hated communist regime.” Radio
Budapest, however, played recorded music and finally an alarmed announcer delivered the
ominous news: “During the course of the night, counterrevolutionary groups attacked various
factories and public buildings. Scores of workers, soldiers, and citizens were murdered.”69
Priester also contrasted Imre Nagy‟s radio addresses, the first on 23 October, in which Nagy
accused the movement of being counterrevolutionary. In his second address a few days later, the
“counterrevolutionary bands” had transformed into “heroic freedom fighters.” 70
In order to explain why this rhetorical transformation occurred, Priester interviewed
Hungarians and in journalistic style included her own experiences with those of the people she
encountered. Like the book published by the Hungarian foreign office regarding U.S.
criminality, Priester used the model of Feindbild to describe the popular uprising. In so doing,
she attempted to exonerate the Communist Party in Hungary and dramatize the events of 1956.
Her images of counterrevolutionaries were more personal and therefore more believable. She
described an interview with a Hungarian “freedom fighter” who could speak little German. Her
suspicions of American connections were confirmed when he replied in fluent English with a
distinct American accent. He later revealed that his group was influenced by Radio Free Europe,
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another indicator that influences from the capitalist West, and more specifically the United
States, were indirectly behind the 1956 uprising. 71
Intellectuals, Priester explained, were also not immune to nefarious Western influences.
She painted the workers as victims of bourgeois intellectuals like the Petőfi-Klub (or Circle) and
the Writer‟s Union. Both groups were integral in instigating revolt and encouraged by the
student movements in Poland. The 1956 revolt adopted Petőfi‟s Nemzeti dal, or National Song,
from the 1848 revolution after Péter Veres, president of the Writer‟s Union, read it aloud to a
crowd on 23 October. Priester claimed that in the days following the revolution the nationalist
words of 1848 resembled more closely the fascist chants of the Horthy-regime as intellectuals
initiated a new White Terror.72 She explained that most Hungarians outside of Budapest neither
understood nor approved of the uprising. The revolt thus only injured workers and peasants
whose lives were interrupted by selfish students.
For Priester even the Hungarian students and Nagy himself were unwitting casualties of
more conniving counterrevolutionary forces, such as former fascists and the imperialist West.
Groups like the Petőfi Circle and the Writer‟s Union compromised their integrity in the fight
against the Party by working with former fascists from the Horthy era. Not only were they
connected to Hungarian fascists but also tightly allied to counterrevolutionaries and their
Western friends.73 Priester questioned the protestors‟ integrity and their commitment to the
people of Hungary by highlighting their connections to Hungary‟s fascist past. It was not lost on
Priester that many East German intellectuals had ties to the Hungarian Writer‟s Union and the
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Petőfi Circle. Though her narrative was intended for a wide audience, Priester‟s criticisms of the
Hungarian revolt often seemed directed against the loyalty of German intellectuals as well.
Texts like Priester‟s represent the East German effort to reclaim the image of the socialist
state as the worker‟s revolutionary regime. However, the memorialization of Hungary‟s
revolutions and the focus on the counterrevolutionaries of 1956 was also an attempt to
marginalize the GDR‟s own uncomfortable legacy of 1953. It is equally significant that
Priester‟s, Obermann‟s, and Lindner‟s texts were intended for mass consumption. They were to
be read by a large number of East Germans to serve the ideological purpose of articulating a
socialist identity and to explain Hungarian society by reference to a comparable revolutionary
past. East German history texts, sometimes implicitly, also emphasized a distinct German
culture and heritage. As a result, even texts analyzing events that occurred in Hungary contained
references to the larger German nation‟s past. The image of Hungary was relayed through
memorialization of a revolutionary legacy that encompassed both Germany and Hungary.
Socialist identity articulated through East German textbooks was an amalgamation of
internationalism and national cultural identity. The Party encouraged East Germans to embrace
their own revolutionary heritage and socialist state by familiarizing the people with a linear
history of a country like their own.
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Chapter 2: The Socialist Public Sphere and Cultural Representation
In addition to their revolutionary legacy, East Germans were encouraged to believe they
were the inheritors of an enlightened intellectual tradition. This chapter focuses on how East
Germans constructed the myth of German cultural authority through the lens of the state
doctrines of antifascism and socialist realism. East Germans appropriated Hungarian ideas and
projected their own culture onto interpretations of the People‟s Republic of Hungary to fashion a
new cultural identity.
East Germans imagined themselves as preservers of the “true Germany.” They claimed
continuity with the intellectual, non-fascist past of Goethe, Schiller, and Bach. East German
intellectuals viewed themselves as “custodians” of German culture and believed that those
traditions transcended the political East-West divide.74 The East German state adopted the
policy of socialist realism as a political means through which to control culture. The socialist
aesthetic was supported by intellectuals like Bertolt Brecht, who helped the state craft a new
form of nationalist opera.75 Until 1961, many East Germans believed the prospect of German
unification was likely. As late as 1959 the SED predicted that the illegitimate Federal Republic
would eventually be absorbed into their socialist regime: “In the patriot‟s struggle for a unified,
peace-loving, and truly democratic Germany, the GDR must be strengthened by various
interests, because it is the strong bulwark in the struggle for national reunification and the
embodiment of the future unified Germany.”76
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During the first decade of the GDR, the SED was obsessed with legitimating its authority
and consolidating the central-administrative system. Also called the Dauerkrise, or permanent
crisis, this period of centralization and development lasted from the foundation of the East
German state in 1949 to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. 77 With the increasing escalation
of the Cold War, negative legitimation of non-socialist regimes became a central part of SED
policy. The 1953 uprising was not a clear-cut failure of the regime‟s legitimation policies or of
their “secret” Meinungsforschung (opinion research), as the workers‟ protests were at first rooted
in economic dissatisfaction rather than politics. Still, it caused the insecure SED to become more
of a plebiscitary regime, fixated on privately documenting public opinion and legitimating its
claim to authority. 78 The Hungarian uprising of 1956 presented an even greater challenge to the
task of state legitimacy, as its demands were overtly cultural and political in nature. The
Politbüro of the SED continued its strategy of negative legitimation with new intensity but
focused equally on defining socialist regimes in positive terms.
Most important for East German legitimacy was the humanist facet of the German
socialist cultural legacy. A pamphlet about scientific research in the GDR published by the Liga
für Volksfreundschaft der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, or League for People‟s
Friendship of the German Democratic Republic, emphasized the cooperative and practical nature
of science in the GDR. They envisioned themselves as direct inheritors of the German scientific
traditions of naturalist Alexander von Humboldt and physicist Max Planck. The pamphlet
declared that mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was the “spiritual ancestor” of the
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German Academy of Sciences in Berlin. This pamphlet revealed East Germany‟s attempts to
legitimate itself internationally by drawing connections to Germany‟s constructive past. The
treatise concluded with a positivist quote that implied that the GDR represented the rightful
Germany: “They [scientists] are therefore working in the spirit of the great humanist Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe: „I hold it for truth that humanity will ultimately win.‟” 79
The Party ostensibly celebrated the thinker in his or her role of cultivating humanistic
learning, though the relationship of the SED state with intellectuals, who often wrote scathing
critiques of the regime, was at times tumultuous. Even so, the regime perpetuated the notion that
intellectual culture should be fêted in place of capitalist materialism. Indeed, the Central
Committee (ZK) of the SED classified Western society as “Unkultur” (Nonculture, implying
barbarism), as opposed to the triumph of cultural humanism in the people‟s democratic republics.
In 1952, the SED founded the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, charged
with the development of “manifold international contacts in the cultural sphere and carrying to
all parts of the world the message of the existence and efforts of a new democratic Germany.” 80
Through cultural relations the GDR hoped to build ties to both foreign intellectuals and the
working classes to legitimate the East German state. It is not surprising that official and cultural
texts regarding other countries used both intellectuals and mass culture as their subjects.
Scholars have recently interpreted the relationship between intellectual culture and the
state with an emphasis on participation rather than dissent. Many academics actively participated
in the formation of the GDR and its relations to other socialist countries. Indeed, the first East
German diplomats to the People‟s Republic of Hungary were intellectuals. Stefan Heymann,
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ambassador in Budapest during the early 1950s, was also a professor who authored books
dealing with East German cultural policy, Marxist theory, economics, and racism. He helped
draft antifascist principles and the regime‟s policy toward Hungary during the 1956 crisis. 81
Werner Mittenzwei‟s study of literature in the GDR investigates the connection between
intellectuals and the state by exploring the effect of a writing public on politics. 82 In her study on
the complex role of the individual in socialist society, Esther von Richthofen contends that
cultural activity allowed East Germans to maintain a sense of involvement by voicing discontent
within the context of personal enjoyment.83 Both East and West Germany developed a particular
way of life and “established patterns of socialization.” 84 Thus, participation and culture for the
people in the GDR dictatorship was just as complex for East Germans as in the lives of their
Western counterparts. Though cultural life was channeled by authorities in East Germany, it
cannot be reduced to repression and control.
Furthermore, no clear dichotomy existed between the regime and its people. East
German society should not be characterized as a constant binary of imposition and subversion.
There was often negotiation between the state and the populace as well as citizen participation at
all levels of East German society. By the 1970s a compromise between the regime and people
had developed that relied on mutual interests and cooperation. The state became

81

Ingrid Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag,
2000), 166.
82
Werner Mittenzwei, Die Intellektuellen: Literatur und Politik in Ostdeutschland 1945-2000 (Berlin: Aufbau,
2003).
83
Esther von Richthofen, Bringing Culture to the Masses: Control, Compromise and Participation in the GDR
(New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009).
84
Ibid., 2.

34

“vergesellschaftet” or “societalised.”85 A semi-public sphere also developed in the early years of
the GDR, what Mary Fulbrook terms a “participatory dictatorship.”86
It is thus important to understand that public opinion did not always exist in opposition to
official ideology. Richthofen illustrates the reciprocity of shaping cultural life in the GDR by
investigating high and mass culture from organized state events to theatre to leisure activities,
like card games. Mass culture, the intelligentsia, and the regime‟s dictates often influenced one
other. Official, intellectual, and popular culture therefore informed the East German perception
of Hungary and Hungarians. This chapter builds on Richthofen‟s notion of East German cultural
participation by analyzing intellectual, artistic, and popular representation of Hungary.
Intellectuals in East Germany contributed to both an official and unofficial project of
crafting a distinct socialist-German identity. Intellectuals often articulated that identity through
cultural representation. Many writers and academics negotiated this space between fiction and
reality as preservers of German tradition. Even dissenting intellectuals played a large role in the
formation of a semi-public sphere and supplied cultural iconography for formal renderings of
Hungary‟s relation to German identity. However, intellectuals did not exist in a vacuum and
their actions were not entirely dictated by the regime. Within the small public sphere of the
GDR, intellectuals informed mass perception and were in turn influenced by representations of
Hungary in popular culture.
In the mid-twentieth century, German and Hungarian leftist intellectuals observed the
transformation of their governments from fascist dictatorships to Soviet occupied territories to
Communist dictatorships. Some, such as Anna Seghers, who was married to Hungarian
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Communist Laszlo Radvanyi, interacted with Hungarian radicals while in exile during the rule of
the NSDAP in Germany and the Horthy regime in Hungary. 87 Politicians like Walter Ulbricht,
Wilhelm Pieck, and Mátyás Rákosi communicated and exchanged ideas while in exile in the
Soviet Union. Neues Deutschland, the organ of the SED, printed an article in 1949 that
discussed Germany and Hungary‟s close cultural relationship. Hungarian leader Rákosi
explained that he had lived and worked in Germany and had a good rapport with East German
leaders Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl. Rákosi declared with confidence at a youth
conference in Budapest in 1949: “I know the German people very well.” (“Ich kenne das
deutsche Volk sehr gut.”) He continued in his conviction that youth in Germany worked for a
new, democratic Germany, just as Hungarians struggled to establish socialism. 88
Leaders like Rákosi and Pieck also developed relations with Marxist intellectuals in exile
and were influenced by their ideas. The ideas of György Lukács (also written as Georg)
resonated with these leaders and enjoyed particular influence in East Germany. Indeed, Lukács‟s
ideas formed the basis of the GDR‟s cultural policies. Lukács wrote frequently in German and
lived in Berlin before the First World War and again in the early 1930s before moving to
Moscow. In 1938 he exchanged letters with other exiled Marxist thinkers, namely Bertolt
Brecht, Ernst Bloch, and Anna Seghers, regarding the role of aesthetics in the Marxist
weltanschauung. 89 His German connection made him accessible to East German intellectuals
and leaders alike. However, Lukács lived in Budapest after the war not Berlin, and for most in
the GDR Lukács was known only through his scholarship. Nevertheless, through the ideas of
87

Left wing members of the German intelligentsia were forced into exile to Central and South America, the
Soviet Union, and North America. Exilliteratur as a genre arose from their experiences.
88
“Deutsche Jugend bei Rakosi,” Neues Deutschland. Zentralorgan der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei
Deutschlands, August 26 1949.
89
Manfred Jäger, Kultur und Politik in der DDR, 1945-1990 (Köln: Edition Deutschland Archiv, 1995), 21.

36

intellectuals like Lukács, Hungary had direct influence on cultural administration in the GDR. 90
Lukács was a part of the international, socialist intelligentsia, but his “Hungarianess” became
particularly troubling to East German officials after the 1956 uprising.
Lukács‟s philosophy featured prominently in the policies of East German socialist
realism, the idea that art and literature should reflect working class culture, serve the greater
public good, and further the cause of socialism. 91 Lukács outlined his thoughts regarding
socialist realism in a speech in Budapest in 1949 that was published in Neues Deutschland.92 He
asserted that socialist realism was not radically new. Its character was derived from Germany‟s
cultural past. The socialist literary critic enjoyed a higher purpose than his or her decadent
bourgeois counterpart, in that the socialist focused on the reality of “der werktätige Mensch” (the
working man), whereas bourgeois realism dealt more generally with society as a whole. 93 Neues
Deutschland published another article in 1951 marking Goethe‟s anniversary that expanded on
Lukács‟s ideas regarding the connection of literature, art, and society. The article discussed
Lukács‟s analysis of Goethe‟s Faust as a precursor to socialist realism and as a story that
reflected the idea of freedom.94 As late as 1981, the East German regime outlined its cultural
policies using Lukács‟s notion of the socialist aesthetic:
We experience culture through the diversity and at the level of our social, interpersonal, and
aesthetic relationships, in an intact and beautiful environment and nature, in meaningful spent
leisure, in connection with general knowledge, with art and literature. In this respect, culture and
our ability to experience it are “for all human life, for societal development, as well as for the
existence of the individual, something basic, elemental, and essential.”95
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The author quoted Hans Koch‟s 1979 work about the connections between culture and society,
but Lukács‟s notions of a socialist aesthetic were very much evident.
Lukács‟s ideas influenced intellectual culture in the GDR even more profoundly. He and
his colleagues shared their academic reflections with East German intellectuals and participated
in a kind of socialist “republic of letters.” In November 1956 philosopher Wolfgang Harich and
other academic members of the SED drafted a document demanding more independence for East
German universities and a return to true Marxist-Leninism and Rosa Luxemburg‟s ideas about
liberalization.96 The creators of this document were clearly influenced by the temporary success
of the Hungarian student movement and the Nagy government. To legitimate their stipulations,
they listed personal correspondence with Polish, Hungarian, and Yugoslavian comrades who
shared the same opinions. Harich and his colleagues attributed their ideological development to
their “Hungarian comrade Georg Lukacs.” The document implored the Central Committee to
consider the application of Lukács‟s ideas regarding intellectual freedom within the Party. 97
Unfortunately for Harich, in 1956 such liberal notions threatened the Central Committee of the
SED. Harich was subsequently imprisoned for his criticism of the Party and his suggestion of a
“third way” that involved the “humanist socialism” advocated by Bloch and Lukács. The SED
deemed his group of intellectuals, the so-called “Harich Gruppe,” counterrevolutionary.
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Harich‟s treatise represented the exchange of ideas through scholarly associations like the
Petőfi society, an intellectual organization in Hungary that promoted cultural liberalization.
Numerous East German scholars, especially members of the Schriftstellerverband (Writer‟s
Union) had connections to the Petőfi Circle before the Hungarian Uprising. After 1956,
however, the Party reversed its position on scholars like Lukács, who was suddenly labeled an
arch-revisionist (Erzrevisionist).98 The SED used the Hungarian revolt as justification to
marginalize controversial intellectuals, especially those who were connected to the Petőfi
society. The Central Committee‟s post-1956 cultural critiques attacked both high and mass
culture. The GDR regime‟s spokesmen wrote scathing critiques of Bloch‟s work, forced the
head of the Department of Philosophy at Karl-Marx-Universität into an early emeritus position,
condemned cabaret as Unkultur, and censored the satires of the weekly magazine Eulenspiegel.99
The Party‟s allergic reaction to the 1956 Hungarian revolt illustrated its fear of domestic
subversion and delegitimization. When the SED formulated its image and the image of other
socialist countries they were always cognizant of the other Germany. The regime thus employed
cultural policies to construct a positive image of the true, socialist Germany. Portrayals of
culture in the GDR also relied on representations of other socialist countries. The purpose of
including different communities, like the Magyar, was threefold: these depictions affirmed
socialist unity, stressed the multiculturalism of East Germany and their aversion to fascist
racism, and perhaps most important, established by comparison with other nations that the GDR
was a functioning and legitimate state.
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The DDR Revue, a monthly magazine in English, was published for this explicit purpose.
From 1956, issues focused on a variety of subjects, including peasant customs, film, theatre,
science, art, industry, sport, and nature. The first issue of the DDR Revue stated that its objective
was the encouragement of “honorable and open international relations, which alone can
contribute to increase the necessary economic and cultural exchange between all nations.” 100 It
is significant that this magazine first appeared in 1956 after the Hungarian uprising when
Communist dictatorships were especially sensitive about their popular legitimacy. The magazine
stressed the peaceful, cultural interaction between East Germans and their socialist counterparts
as well as Western nations. The first issue included testimonials from a French scientist and a
Finnish visitor in the Dresden Philharmonic, both attesting to the progressive nature of East
German science, art, and culture.101 The second and third issues continued to stress East
Germany‟s cultural heritage by featuring Heinrich Heine, Bertolt Brecht, and a story that
described the preservation of East Germany‟s minority Sorb folk culture: “the Sorbs at last found
their Fatherland, the German Democratic Republic.”102
Likewise, popular expression in both the GDR and Hungary in the 1950s reflected the
ideas of socialist realism, legitimacy, and antifascism. Ideology and mass culture intersected
most prominently in radio and literature. The popularity of certain radio programs, such as Da
lacht der Bär allowed producers to maintain some creative liberty despite censors.103 Da lacht
der Bär can thus be analyzed as an expression of socialist popular culture. Still, intellectual
socialist ideas and overt political messages appeared in even comedy radio programs like Da
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lacht der Bär. Such Unterhaltungsangeboten (entertainment programs) emphasized themes such
as Weltfrieden (world peace) and friendship with other socialist nations, thereby bolstering the
positive image of the Eastern Bloc in opposition to Western imperialism. 104
Socialist realism featured even more prominently in Aufbau literature of the 1950s.
Authors during the Aufbau period were encouraged to take time to observe workers or do work
in factories themselves. This inspired positivist novels celebrating Communist society and the
connection of art to the worker. Brigitte Reimann‟s socialist realist novel, Ankunft im Alltag was
often considered the archetype of this genre. 105 Reimann‟s novel centered on three young
graduates, Curt, Nikolaus, and Recha, who spent one year in a Großbetrieb, or large
manufacturing plant. During this year, the heroine, Recha, reconfirmed her socialist ideals and
devotion to East German society, as opposed to the imperialist West which is viewed through the
lens of fascism.
The theme of antifascism resurfaced throughout these discussions as a way of reminding
the reader that East Germany embodied the opposite of Germany‟s fascist past. The DDR Revue
thereby implied that West Germany represented continuity to Hitler‟s Germany. One article
villainized the Federal Republic by highlighting its refusal to participate in progressive
international peace talks.106 By intertwining official rhetoric with intellectual and folk ideas, the
DDR Revue represented the intersection of high and mass culture. The magazine framed these
areas of society by emphasizing international relations, socialist unity, and antifascism, a topic
meant to legitimate Berlin while criminalizing the imperialists in Bonn.
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Antifascism as a political doctrine featured prominently in many East German texts of the
1950s and „60s.107 The doctrine of “Antifaschismus” publically exonerated East Germans from
crimes under the racist regime of the NSDAP by painting them as victims and preservers of true
socialist German culture. The doctrine of antifascism extended to other socialist republics,
especially the People‟s Republic of Hungary. Hungarians as well as East Germans were enrolled
under the category of victim-status in discussions about the Second World War. Hungarian
workers and peasants had suffered under the Horthy regime and later under Nazi occupation, just
as East Germans had under NSDAP rule. The true Hungarians and Germans preserved culture in
the face of fascist oppression. A 1955 book entitled Volksrepublik Ungarn declared that the
Hungarian population declined from 1941 to 1949 due to meaningful losses during the fascist
occupation. More than fifty-seven percent became sacrifices to Hitler‟s terror.108 Extending
antifascism to Hungary in cultural discussions reinforced the idea that Hungarians shared a
common history with East Germans.
Cultural texts also appealed to traditional ideas of Heimat. Socialist policies, such as
antifascism, were often presented through the more palatable medium of folk practices and local
custom. A 1954 songbook for the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth), or FDJ,
included Hungarian folk songs translated into German. The text for a folk song entitled “Fahnen
rauschen,” or “Flags rustle,” was given Communist connotations with words about protecting the
industry and fields of Hungary. Nevertheless, the song relied on distinct themes of traditional
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Heimat. For example, the last stanza affirmed that the free people of Hungary would carry out a
“vow of fidelity to the Fatherland” (“Vaterland, wir leisten dir den Treueschwur”). 109
Texts also described aspects of Hungary‟s constitution in the familiar language of Heimat
in addition to the rhetoric of socialism: “The defense of Heimat [against fascist, imperialist
forces] on the basis of general military conscription is the honor-duty of all citizens.” 110 This
national profile of Hungary further highlighted the idea of cultural Heimat by devoting chapters
to Hungary‟s historic folk art and architecture. Earlier Hungarian art, especially from the
revolutionary period of the early-twentieth century, captured both ideas of Heimat and socialist
realism. Hungary‟s artists working in this tradition in 1919 and 1920 created art for the general
public. As with other forms of cultural expression, it was art‟s duty to fight against injustice and
depict socialist unity, but art‟s most essential purpose was to reflect the lives of the poor, as that
is “the most important aesthetic factor.”111 Significantly, Volksrepublik Ungarn attributed the
emergence of a nascent Hungarian folk art movement to German influences and the
“germanization” of art, reinforcing the idea that German culture embodied the proletariat
revolution.
From the late eighteenth century, Hungarian art began to develop a national character
that, according to the editors of Volksrepublik Ungarn, was decidedly antimonarchical. This
nationalist movement featured triumphant folk art and majestic sculptures, like Marschalkó‟s
famous lions on Budapest‟s Linzhid, or Chain Bridge. The Revolution of 1848/49 marked the
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climax of Hungary‟s cultural movement. 112 Later painters, such as Mihály Munkácsy, also
typified Hungary‟s great folk artists. His realistic paintings depicted Hungarian village life and
thus fit the artistic context of socialist realism of the 1950s and „60s. His work was appropriated
by twentieth-century socialist regimes to represent the turn to democratic concerns.
Volksrepublik Ungarn explained that the Munkácsy‟s ideas of realism were drawn from
democratic ideas regarding the nature of Hungary‟s people and their relation to the land. 113 The
notion of socialist Heimat was apparent in these words, though the author did not explicitly refer
to the term. The author further implied that Munkácsy‟s work was a precursor to socialist
realism: “The heroes of his paintings were simple peasants, recruits from villages, and poor
people in the cities.”114 Framed in these terms, Hungary‟s cultural past became very much a part
of the German reader‟s present.
It was important for the East German state to demonstrate that their leaders closely
interacted with peasant and working class culture. A book commemorating Walter Ulbricht‟s
life displayed various images of the General Secretary at international folk gatherings. In
Hungary, Comrade Ulbricht sat at a long table in a traditional Hungarian pub watching folk
dancers.115 The caption read “baratság,” the Hungarian word for friendship. In this way, the
book highlighted international solidarity and demonstrated socialist realism in practice.
Perhaps even more than folk practices, sport in the GDR illustrated the intersection
between official legitimation of culture and popular expression. The SED declared sport and
fitness (Körperkultur) to be an exceptionally important societal concern at the “heart of the
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socialistic lifestyle.”116 Like art and literature, sport was adapted to the socialist aesthetic as its
purpose was to inculcate a collectivist character. According to the state, the most essential
function of sport was to serve the worker, improve morale, and most important, express the
collective nature of socialism. 117 In the GDR, politics and diplomacy were explicitly connected
to sports, which in its political context became an expression of state hegemony and mass
culture. The Nationalrat‟s tribute to Ulbricht featured photographs of the Party Secretary at
sports events and as a young man playing team sports. According to the text, as an adolescent
Ulbricht was an “avid athlete” (begeisterter Sportler) who never thought of his individual
purpose but rather focused on the success of the team. It was on the pitch, the text emphasized,
where Ulbricht first learned the skills necessary for cooperative work and leadership.118
The collective nature of athletics made it a safe articulation of socialist and German
identity. It was therefore used in both Germanys as a vehicle through which to express
happiness and pride. In addition, sport was a venue that allowed East Germans to communicate
with and define other countries. Both West and East Germany used similar rhetoric to
characterize their international rivals. West Germany‟s official remembrance of the World Cup
illustrated that national identity was often defined through safer cultural channels, like sport. The
FRG‟s official book commemorating their 1954 World Cup victory over Hungary proclaimed,
“Nowhere in the world do so many people play football as in Germany.” 119 The book celebrated
West Germany‟s training programs and mastery over the sport. While the book acknowledged
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the skill of Germany‟s Hungarian rivals, it depicted the eleven West German players who
triumphed over Hungary as national heroes.
East Germany‟s Die XXI Olympischen Spiele, a commemorative work of the 1956
Olympics in Melbourne, employed the same heroic language as their West German
counterparts.120 The text lauded the cooperative efforts of East German athletes in their
preparation for the Olympic Games and included memoirs of their experience abroad. Like the
FRG‟s Weltmeisterschaft, the GDR‟s Olympischen Spiele presented Hungarians as worthy
competitors. For East Germans, more than West Germans, it was important to emphasize the
friendly rivalries of their Eastern Bloc allies. The GDR‟s commemorative compilation included
as a preface words from the President of the International Olympic Committee that stressed the
peaceful purposes of the Olympic Games, specifically how sports brought together even West
and East Germany. 121 Heinz Schöbel, the President of the National Olympic Committee of the
GDR, emphasized similar themes of unity and camaraderie in his foreword. He stated that the
summer games served the larger ideals of people‟s friendship (Völkerfreundschaft) and the
collective unity of humanity. 122 In this way, sport became a kind of a mass diplomacy.
A Sportlied (Sport Song) in the FDJ songbook equated sport with socialism‟s
progression, German Heimat, and international friendship. After entreating youth to throw the
ball high, the lyrics pronounced, “Socialism is our plan, for Heimat, friends, we draw the
watch.”123 Set to a march tempo, the song repeated the phrase “Vorwärts zum Ziel,” denoting
both the physical athletic goal of victory and the final triumph of world socialism. Athletes thus
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participated in the East German project in a tangible way. This message was not lost on the
compilers of the GDR‟s Olympic memoir. Many of the images depicted victorious athletes from
other socialist republics, especially those from the Soviet Union and Hungary, both of which had
strong athletic programs in the 1950s and „60s. The book noted that Hungary received more gold
medals than some larger, Western nations. Sports like fencing received several pages, as
Hungary received the most accolades in that sport. A photograph of Rudolf Karpati, the
champion at saber, was featured beside a picture of a British fencer, confirming that socialist
nations could not only compete with Western nations but also supersede them. 124 It is
worthwhile to point out that while the book exhibited images of most of Hungary‟s gold medal
winners with anecdotes about their victories, it neglected details regarding Hungary‟s water polo
team. Hungary‟s team had, after all, defeated the Soviet Union in the semi-finals in the famously
violent “Blood in the Water” match. The Hungarian team allegedly sought revenge for the Soviet
repression of Hungary‟s October uprising, creating a “blood bath” and a story that was
exaggerated in Western newspapers. East Germany avoided the contentious subject matter and
Hungarian water polo altogether in favor of emphasizing socialist unity and international
camaraderie.
The theme of socialist unity was also applied to Hungarian football. The Hungarian
aranycsapat (golden team) of the 1950s was considered unsurpassed in Europe. East German
officials emphasized socialist ability by celebrating the Hungarian football team, at least before
most of the players defected to the West in the late 1950s. Issues of Neues Deutschland dating
from the early 1950s focused frequently on the success of football in Hungary, even if it meant

124

Die XVI. Olympischen Spiele in Melbourne 1956, 149.

47

reporting losses for East German teams. 125 One article entitled “Ungarns Hünen sind da!”
(Hungarians‟ Giants are here!) celebrated the arrival of the aranycsapat in Berlin. The article
stated that the leaders of the sports committees of the GDR and Hungary greeted one another as
representatives of the friendship that existed between these two democratic people. The article
asserted that President Varga of Hungary brought his country‟s finest football players but also
the greetings of more than 350,000 workers in Budapest.126
Neues Deutschland reaffirmed the socialist aesthetic in sports; these athletes signified not
only their team affiliation but also the workers and farmers at home in Hungary. For East
Germans, the aranycsapat, with its stars like Ferenc Puskás, provided a tangible and
recognizable image of Hungarians. Football, perhaps more than art or literature, was an
accessible and appealing way for regular East Germans to interact with their socialist neighbors.
Sports connected mass culture to official ideology and even to ideas of socialist aestheticism, as
sport related more closely to everyday experience, in ways that official propaganda or high forms
of art could not. Athletic competition in post-war Europe was something familiar and
exhilarating. Sports supplied a Hungarian icon that seemed identical to the East German athlete
and served as a new nationalism, or in the case of East Germany and Hungary, internationalism.

125

“Budapest-Ostzonenauswahl 3:2,” Neues Deutschland, August 1949, Sport section.
“Ungarns Hünen sind da!” Neues Deutschland, Oktober 1949, Sport section. “Er bringe nicht nur Ungarns
beste Fußballspielder nach Berlin, sondern zugleich die Grüße von mehr als 350000 Budapester Werktätigen, die
mit den besten Wünschen den Neuaufbau des demokratischen Deutschland verfolgen.”
126

48

Chapter 3: Engaging the Socialist “Other?”: East German Travel to Hungary
East Germans most directly interacted with Hungarians through travel. Travel allowed
East German to formulate empirical perceptions of Hungary that combined ideas about socialist
fraternity with the subtext of “Otherness.” This chapter examines how direct and indirect
interaction between East German citizens and the Hungarian landscape affected their perceptions
of another socialist country. These ideas of the People‟s Republic of Hungary informed broad
notions of what it meant to be a socialist as well as what it meant to be a German-socialist in
contrast to the Hungarian socialist “Other.” I define “travel” broadly to include both a physical
journey to another place, usually in the form of tourism, and “imaginary travel,” which
comprises activities that do not require physical movement but are still viewed as interaction
with another place or culture. Imaginary travel in this sense encompasses consumption of goods,
popular literature, and images.
East German travel in the 1950s and 1960s revealed an attempt to return to a state of prewar normality of consumer tourism, though German travel during this period also reflected postwar restlessness. Both Rudy Koshar and W.G. Sebald identify the modernist theme of
displacement as precedent for this facet of deutscher Tourismus.127 However, East German
travel is often overlooked in discussions of tourism as merely a collective expression of state
authority. To be sure, travel was directed primarily by the FDGB, or Freier Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Federation), and the Reisebüro der DDR (Travel
Agency of the GDR), yet East Germans traveled almost as frequently as their West German
counterparts and should not be omitted from the discourse of tourism. Eighty percent of East
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Germans spent their holidays within the GDR, but another twenty percent ventured beyond East
Germany‟s borders to other socialist countries. 128 As travel to Western capitalist countries was
inaccessible to the average East German, many sought to fulfill their peripatetic desire by
traveling to other socialist countries. Awaiting bureaucratic approval and expense dissuaded
most East Germans from visiting faraway destinations such as Cuba or the Black Sea. The
famed Plattensee, or Lake Balaton, in Hungary thus became an East German Mallorca.
The western Hungarian landscape, especially the area around Lake Balaton, provided the
medium through which German-Hungarian cultural interaction occurred. The Balaton area was
first romanticized by nineteenth-century German intellectuals and remained a tourist destination
for Germans into the twentieth century. In particular, East Germans enjoyed the Plattensee as a
tourist destination and a means of escape. Not only did East Germans influence the cultural
landscape in Hungary, but travel to the Balaton region also provided an experiential outlet to
define one‟s own identity against the Hungarian “Other.” Though the Magyar was a familiar
“Other” for East German travelers, they were, nevertheless, aware of cultural differences.
German travel guides emphasized vestiges of an older Hungarian cultural legacy and the beauties
of the Hungarian landscape. Descriptions of the Balaton region as a natural socialist preserve
appealed to the GDR‟s promotion of collective camping and hiking, but also to German
traditions of Wanderung. A 1959 German language travel guide for the Plattensee invited its
socialist neighbors to enjoy the natural landscape in the surrounding areas. An introductory
letter to Balaton‟s visitors emphasized Hungary‟s postwar establishment of socialism and the
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equality that existed in the area as a result of Hungary‟s new cooperative regime. 129 The guide‟s
introduction also included a geographical description of western Hungary and described
Balaton‟s hills and sunny shores as an ideal environment for nature activities, like hiking or
observing flora and fauna. 130 Despite the introduction‟s attempt to provide a scientific report of
the area‟s economy, climate, and geology, the majority of descriptions of Balaton‟s landscape
were romantic renderings meant to appeal to the traditional sense of Heimat.
For East German tourists, Hungary was a foreign yet familiar space. The travel guide
implicitly linked nature with a cultural, romantic past. It urged visitors who might holiday in
Balatonfüred, a town on the north shore of the sea, to locate the oldest tree in the park and read
the poetic inscription:
“When I am no longer on this earth, my tree,
Let the ever renewed leaves of the spring
Murmur to the wayfarer:
The poet did love while he lived.” 131
Including this tree and its poem as a tourist attraction indicated that the German tourist should
value the Hungarian scenery in terms of idealistic, literary notions of nature. The guide likewise
pointed out other towns surrounding Balaton as natural preserves. The book hailed the town of
Tapolca, with its extensive cave system and access to cycling, canoeing, and hiking, as the ideal
landscape for “friends of nature” (Naturfreunde).132 The encyclopedic Volksrepublik Ungarn
presented Hungary‟s geography in similar terms by focusing on rural life and farming. It
celebrated the fact that Hungary at one time was primarily an agrarian land, highlighting the
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agricultural success of the Alföldi plain. 133 In addition, the text associated landscape with
Hungary‟s cultural monuments by featuring images of picturesque villages alongside art
museums and famous statues like the figure of the martyred bishop Gellért overlooking Budapest
and a monument to revolutionary leader Lajos Kossuth.134 These photographs served to connect
Hungary‟s national culture to its landscape.
Tied closely to notions of nature and landscape, Hungarian folk culture provided an
image of an accessible Hungary with which German tourists could directly engage. The Balaton
guide urged German visitors to frequent folk museums and view cultural landmarks in the
region. The town of Keszthely boasted the oldest churches and statues. The art and architecture
of Keszthely ranged from gothic to baroque to modern. 135 The emphasis on these traditional and
untarnished local forms of art likely appealed to East Germans who lived in devastated, post-war
Europe. German tourists were encouraged to view even the traditional, primitive Hungarian
thatched homes as Volkskunst, or folk art. These dwellings signified the ingenuity of the
Hungarian people in this region. 136 In order to add to the quaint allure of these regions, the guide
relayed local fairy tales. The author devoted two pages about the town of Tihany to a local
Märchen that attributed the inlet‟s noise (Tihanyer Echos) to a beautiful mountain princess who
was imprisoned by the wave king (Wellenkönig) and forced to forever answer people‟s
questions.137 Such Märchen would be familiar to East Germans who read prominent Hungarian
stories and poems, like “Lúdyas Matyi,” the celebrated folk story of the peasant goose shepherd,
Matyi, who outsmarted and took revenge on the malevolent local lord Dániel Döbröghy. Neues
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Deutschland even featured a story about a Hungarian film derived from the folk tale. 138 The
article applauded the film for brilliantly capturing peasant culture and class conflict. Romantic
stories, like Lúdas Matyi and Tihany‟s princess of the Sound, added to the familiar flavor and
folk character of the local landscape but also were consistent with the project of socialist realism.
Even Hungary‟s thermal baths were framed within history and folk culture. Since the
seventeenth century, German and Hungarian elites traveled to the region for the healing waters
of natural springs. “The local people knew that the beneficial properties of the water‟s source
protected against stomach ailments and various other conditions.”139 The text further
emphasized early German folk connections to the area by quoting German traveler Matthäus
Lower‟s 1694 description of Balaton‟s thermal baths and their healing properties.
Gästeherbergen, or guest houses, were erected for German tourists as early as the eighteenth
century. The guide pointed out that visitors could still stay in some of these early inns while
visiting the “berühmteste ungarische Badeort” (“the most famous Hungarian bath locale”) in
Balatonfüred.140 Here the tour guide explicitly linked Germany‟s and Hungary‟s pasts to tourism
of the 1950s. East Germans visiting the Plattensee were connected to their national predecessors
in a physical way by traversing the same landscapes and participating in a new form of blended
Hungarian-German culture.
Sports and other leisure activities likewise characterized proposed holidays in the Balaton
region. The guide included images of beach life, sailing, and swimming in the sunny southern
regions of Balaton. By contrast, the description of Siófok centered on its revolutionary history.
The author lamented the dark days of Siófok‟s history when Horthy and the
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counterrevolutionaries made it their base of operation. However, the guide assured its readers
that since 1945 and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Siófok had become a
new center for sport and culture – a true worker‟s paradise.141 The guidebook framed its
discussion of traditional Balaton with socialist themes like revolutionary heritage that were
equally recognizable to East Germans. The introduction, after all, listed as its purpose to spread
Hungarian culture and socialist friendship through travel. 142
In many ways, the Plattensee tour guide connected official, intellectual, and popular
iconography of Hungary. The text also emphasized that German culture was a part of Balaton,
and that many people in the region spoke German in addition to their native Hungarian. This
may have been included to reinforce the idea of socialist friendship and encourage tourism, but it
also provided German travelers with a sense of security and an idea that Hungarians were more
like displaced Germans than eastern “Others.” East Germans could therefore travel to the
Balaton region and connect with Hungarian folklore, history, sports, and landscape without
having to depart from “the familiar Other.”
Travel allowed East German tourists a medium through which to engage socialist Heimat
by interacting with nature and folk culture, but it also offered the East German traveler an escape
from political pressures. The attempt to establish new societal norms and to adjust to new
ideological realities was evidenced in travel literature, such as Helmut Hauptmann‟s 1957 travel
journal Donaufahrt zu dritt. Hauptmann and his companions embarked from the GDR on a
journey that would take them down the Danube River from its alleged source in a town in West
Germany to the Black Sea. From the beginning, Hauptmann clarified that his adventure was
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ideological as well as empirical. In West Germany, he and his companions were confronted by
two women who criticized the Communist system. Hauptmann, of course, proved them wrong
after a good-natured discussion. 143 Much of Hauptmann‟s exposition confirmed that socialist
countries along the Danube had recovered and were thriving as well as or better than their
Western counterparts.
Like the authors of the Plattensee guide, Hauptmann described the Danube Bend, or
Dunakanyar, using romantic language. He extolled the beauty of its hills and mountains and
included charming, scenic photographs of Esztergom, one of the oldest Hungarian cities as well
as the castles of Visegrád.144 Hauptmann and his companions spent time in Budapest, which he
termed the “queen of the Danube” to enjoy the cultural offerings. They sampled Hungarian wine,
observed peasant women selling their wares, listened to gypsy music, and were impressed at how
well some Hungarians spoke German.145 Hauptmann relayed a sense of ease and familiarity
among the Hungarians. In fact, he and his colleagues seemed more comfortable in Budapest
than in the western German speaking areas of their travels, like the Black Forest and Vienna. As
his account was published in 1957, it is likely that there was a political message behind
Hauptmann‟s image of the Hungarian people. Hauptmann‟s presentation of Hungarians as good
socialists, close to the land and factories, exonerated the majority of the people from the 1956
uprising and instead placed blame on a few counterrevolutionaries and misguided students.
Hauptmann‟s idyllic descriptions of the Hungarian countryside, Budapest, and the people he
encountered painted an optimistic and memorable image of East Germany‟s socialist friends on
the Danube.
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Many East Germans relied on descriptions like Hauptmann‟s to construct images of
countries like Hungary, as the majority of people did not holiday outside of the GDR. They also
formulated ideas about Hungary based on photographs and rare Hungarian commodities, like
paprika, palinka from the Alföldi region, wine from western Hungary, or commemorative
stamps. Communist regimes often released stamps that memorialized folk culture, the Olympic
Games, workers, and art.146 In short, many East Germans consumed Hungarian culture without
venturing beyond the GDR‟s borders.
There was an emphasis on the unique cultural heritages of East Germany and Hungary
but also on shared artistic beauty and socialist realist themes. The GDR‟s 1963 Fotojahrbuch
aligned more closely with the project of socialist realism and crafting the proper iconography for
other socialist republics.147 The Fotojahrbuch‟s purpose followed the principles of socialist
realism by purporting that it would supply Communist internationalism with a human face as
well as inform East Germans about worldwide human conditions. Its mission statement declared
that photography must “show the real things, to provide a natural copy of reality.” Their
photographers followed the dictum to depict their subjects “the way the things really are.”148
The Fotojahrbuch‟s images of non-European socialist countries, such as Vietnam, Cuba, and the
People‟s Republic of China, emphasized ethnic and cultural differences and thus reflected ideas
about multiculturalism and implicit notions of exotic “Otherness.”149 In contrast, the
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photographs of Hungary presented familiar images of workers and customary folk practices. A
romantic image entitled “Fischfang am Plattensee,” or “Fishing on Balaton,” displayed
silhouetted figures of fishermen at sunset. 150 Other images included a Hungarian fencing team, a
bride crying at a traditional wedding, men rowing, industrial workers and new machinery, and a
worker laboring proudly at a furnace. 151 Nevertheless, East Germans were aware that Hungary
offered a somewhat different cultural flavor than Germany. One of the largest images in the
Fotojahrbuch was a panorama of Budapest and the Danube at night.152 This photograph
diverged from the others in that it created a fantastic icon of Hungary‟s capital. The book
therefore framed the slightly exotic with the mundane.
East German ideas about Hungary were political in nature, but direct travel contained
social as well as political motives. During periods of strict travel restrictions within the GDR,
the Balaton region provided a meeting place for West and East Germans. Families separated by
the Wall met at the Plattensee. 153 Balaton thus acted as a space separate from the political
landscapes of the two Germanys. This region of western Hungary became a third Germany,
where East and West could meet and escape the cultural and political restraints of the FRG and
the GDR. A former East German interpreter explained in an interview that Hungary served as a
rendezvous point for her family after she fled the GDR. She and her family had fond memories
of Hungary since it provided refuge.154 She was certainly not the only East German to enjoy the
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benefits of relaxed travel to Hungary. Ivan Volgyes implies that Hungarians and East Germans
alike observed the stark differences between West and East, the Mercedes and the Trabant, when
they travelled in Hungary. 155 A recent article in the Frankfurter Rundschau asserted that the first
stages of reunification occurred on Balaton‟s shores.156
As a result of East German tourism during the latter half of the twentieth century, the
Hungarian cultural landscape engaged both German and Hungarian identities. It developed a
syncretic personality characterized increasingly by Hungarian and German cultural kitsch:
Hungarian folk dancing, traditional thatched homes and cabins, modern hotels, German beer and
food, and a mixture of German and Hungarian languages. The cultural syncretism of the Balaton
region demonstrated how German cultural influences rooted in socialist-era travel have
transformed landscapes outside of Germany that resonate into contemporary culture. Balaton
existed as a space not wholly German yet not entirely Hungarian either. East German travel to
Hungary illuminated not only how East Germans interacted within the temporal and spatial
framework of the Eastern Bloc but also explained the existing heterogeneity in places like
western Hungary.
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Conclusion
Walter Ulbricht announced in a speech in Budapest the existence of an improved
brotherly relationship between the GDR and Hungary in 1967 after signing a pact of friendship
with the UVR‟s leaders.157 This contract of international camaraderie promised that both
Hungarians and East Germans would work for the betterment of world socialism. It repeated
phrases about antifascism and shared revolutionary heritage that by 1967 had become cliché.
The new contract for international relations reiterated notions of a unique shared East GermanHungarian culture that had been formulated in the first two decades of the GDR.
During the 1950s East Germans still felt connected to a German nation rooted in an older
nineteenth-century reality but also shared a new identity with socialist republics like Hungary.
After the 1956 Hungarian uprising, the regime‟s crisis of legitimacy made the project of
articulating a safe and attractive Hungarian image seem more urgent. The focus shifted from
intellectuals like György Lukács, who had been associated with the movement for cultural
liberalization, to the Hungarian folk. To be sure, the SED was more attentive to popular opinion
to stave off discontent. The Central Committee encouraged FDJ leaders to “spice up their
speeches with jokes” to appeal to mass adolescent audiences. 158 In this spirit, depictions of
Hungary centered increasingly on sports stars, folk customs, and hard-working peasants and
workers. Still, earlier interaction with Lukács, especially with his articulation of the socialist
aesthetic, and the ideas of intellectuals in the Petőfi Circle, contributed to the cultural policy of
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the East German state and continued to influence leaders and intellectuals alike until
Wiedervereinigung, or unification.
Negotiating identity in a Communist dictatorship, where most activities were state
directed, was never truly a free enterprise. However, East Germans found mediums through
which to formulate popular cultural expression. Sport, folk practices, travel, and even
participation in the state provided ordinary citizens opportunities to fashion ideas about what it
meant to be German and socialist. Imagining other socialist countries with similar customs and
histories made the task of Communist internationalism seem less complicated and supported the
regime‟s cultural policies of socialist realism and antifascism.
East German identity developed as a hybrid of socialist and German culture, but it was
also fluid. German localism, international socialism, and notions of nationalism intertwined to
form assumptions of what it meant to be East German but also what it meant to be a part of the
socialist Eastern Bloc. By defining countries like Hungary by German standards, East Germans
established a notion of the importance of their own cultural influence in the Eastern Bloc.
Certainly, they were aware of their importance as a symbol of the Cold War, and thoughts of
their cultural and revolutionary legacy only legitimated attitudes of authority.
Cultural texts from the early years of the GDR provided a vehicle through which the state
articulated and inculcated post-war identity that, though ideologically socialist, was culturally
German. These texts suggested that Hungary and Germany shared a parallel revolutionary
history, a rich cultural heritage, and familiar geo-political landscapes. East Germans both read
and fashioned those texts and by so doing engaged the incongruous notions of familiar and
unfamiliar, national and foreign. By appealing to working class traditions, sentiments of Heimat,
local loyalties, romantic images of landscape, and memories of revolution, the GDR combined
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the Marxist-Leninist ideal of an international Workers‟ and Peasants‟ State with continuities
from the past and created a normalized space for the majority of East Germans. In its project to
construct a cultured, socialist society separate from the imperialist West, East Germany relied on
tropes like Heimat that had been employed since the nineteenth century. Their Germanized
image of Hungary was in fact quite similar to West Germany‟s depictions of countries like
Hungary. In the 1950s, ideas of Heimat and folk practice came under the umbrella of East
German cultural-political terms like socialist realism and antifascism. These terms, however, did
not change the traditional nature of the concepts behind Heimat and mass culture.
It is surprising how closely the GDR‟s iconography of the People‟s Republic of
Hungary corresponded to East German self-representations. The illusion that their cultures and
traditions paralleled created a palatable and safe eastern “Other” through which to communicate
socialist identity. Analogous narratives did not feature in the GDR‟s depictions of other socialist
countries. East German portrayals of China, Vietnam, and Cuba, for example, contained images
of exoticism. The East German portrait of Hungary and the Magyar certainly diverged from this
unusual “Other.” Instead, East Germans created an iconography of Hungary that was more
German in appearance than Hungarian.
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